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General Equilibrium  Theory (GE) scrutinizes the ability of markets to achieve efficient 
allocation of resources.  The main purpose of this work is, in the framework to the GE to 
analyze, the possibility of design a mechanism enabling agents to make independent 
decisions compatible with social welfare. More precisely, we address the problem of the 
possibility of decentralization mechanism to sustain efficiency and social welfare at the 
same time. Specifically, introducing a social utility function, we argue on the possibility of 
improving the social welfare transferring resources between periods of the economy. This 
mechanism introduces a Rawlsian solution improving the welfare of the individuals worst 
positioned. 
 
Keywords: Welfare, efficiency, decentralization. 
 
Resumen 
La Teoría del Equilibrio General  examina la capacidad de los mercados para lograr una 
asignación eficiente de los recursos. Nuestro principal objetivo en este trabajo es,  el de  
analizar, en el marco de la referida teoría, la posibilidad  de implementar  un mecanismo 
que permita a los agentes  tomar decisiones independientes compatibles con el bienestar 
social. Más precisamente, abordar el problema de la existencia de un mecanismo que, de 
manera descentralizada,  permita  lograr la eficiencia y el  bienestar social al mismo 
tiempo. En concreto, se muestra como si se permite en una economía de dos períodos,  
transferir libremente recursos entre ambos,  la acción independiente de los agentes 
económicos en el mercado,  es capaz de lograr la distribución de recursos preferida por la 
sociedad. 
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1  Introduction 
 
To consider plans for improving the welfare of an economy is necessary to consider 
intertemporal economies over several periods. We will consider in this work a simple 
dynamic model having two periods. In particular, we will specialize the two-period model 
even more by analyzing a two-period exchange economy model, inhabited by agents who 
live two periods. Maximization is over feasible consumption program 
ln t R c c c + ∈ : } , {
2 1  and 
{1,2} ∈ t . Where  1 c  is an allocation for time  1 = t  and 
2 c  one allocation for period  2 = t , 
n is the number of agents, leaving in two periods, and l  the number of different goods. 
Goods are available in positive quantities in both periods. We consider two possible points 
of view, the point of view of individual and perfectly informed agents, and on the other 
hand the point of view of a social planner interested in the society's aggregate welfare. We 
will analyze the possibility of defining a mechanism able to unify these two different and 
some times antagonistic points of view. 
We are particularly interested in comparing the possible levels of social welfare 
that can be attained from individual decisions in an economy when consumers have 
possibilities to transfer wealth between periods, with the levels of welfare that can be 
attained when this possibility does not exist. At the same time, we relate these levels with 
the social welfare attained for an economy when the action of a benevolent central planner 
is considered. We focus on the intertemporal consumption/saving as a individual decision 
and then we compare this decision with the decisions of a central planner looking for the 
social welfare. We find that the result of the participation of a benevolent central planner 
can be substituted by individual decisions of agents if those with better opportunities have 
a high degree of social commitment. But if this is not the case, then the central planner can 
do more than lump-sum redistributions to improve the social welfare. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section (2) we introduce the model, for 
simplicity, this paper considers an economy lasting only two periods. There is also 
complete certainty, as well as perfect and complete information. Each agent is assumed to 
have a feasible set of net trades which is separable into two history dependent feasible sets, 
one for each period. Agents have preferences which can be represented by the sum of two 
separate history dependent single period utility functions, each defined on the relevant set 
of feasible net trades. Moreover, a Negishi social welfare function in the form of a sum 
over all agents' utilities is postulated. In section (3) we consider a two-period economy 2 
 
such that consumers can not do transferences from one period to another, and we look for 
the efficient allocations attainable. In section (4) we allow transferences between periods. 
This kind of transferences changes the endowments disposable in each period for each 
agent, but not the total of resources disposable for each agent of the economy in 
aggregating in both periods. We look for a distribution of resources between periods 
allowing to attain a Pareto optimal allocation maximizing the social utility function. In 
section (5) we introduce the central planner. The main role of the central planner is to 
implement an incentive policy to attain an optimal transference of resources between 
periods, considering as optimal a policy that gives the possibility to attain the maximal 
social welfare. We compare the social welfare level possible to be attained following the 
central planner policy, with the optimal level of welfare attained by a policy of lending and 
saving developed by the individual agents of the economy. Finally as a conclusion, in 
section (6) we consider the possibilities to attain a maximal social welfare, in a 
decentralized way. 
 
2  The model 
 
We consider a two period neoclassical economy symbolized by  
  { } I i w u R E i i
l ∈ + , , , = 
where  } {1,... = n I  is an index set, one for each agent. The economy have l  goods in each 
period. Assume that the n agents of the economy derive utilities  ) ( i i c u  from the two 
periods consumption bundle  1,2. = ; 1,..., = , ), , ( =
2 1 t n i R c c c c
l t






i c c c  we 
symbolize a bundle set for the  th i −  agent available in time t. 
The agents welfare is defined as the present value of the sum of current and future 
utility discounted at a rate θ :  
 ). ( ) ( = ) , (
2 1 2 1
i i i i i i i c U e c U c c u
θ − +  (1) 
In each period utilities are strictly concave, increasing and 
1 C  in interior of 
l R+ i.e: 




it ∈ ∈ ∀
∂
∂
 and  {1,2} ∈ t  and satisfies the boundary condition is a 
sequence of vectors  i c  converges to a vector with some coordinate equal to zero, then 3 
 






ij c ∈ ∈ ∀ ∞
∂
∂
→  Because utilities are normalized to take 
nonnegative values,  0 ≥ i U . 
The endowments are denoted by  ) , ( =
2 1
i i i w w w  where 
, 1,..., = , n i R w
l t
i + ∈ and 1,2 = t . The total resources distribution is given by 
), , ( =
2 1 Ω Ω Ω  where the coordinates represent respectively the stocks of goods available in 
the economy in each period  1,2; = t  i.e:  1,2. = , = t w
t
i i
t ∑ Ω  
Following [Negishi, T.], we consider a social welfare function as a weighted sum of 
individual utility functions. Denote this social utility function by the time-additive 
separable function:  
  ( ) ) ( ) ( = ) , ( = ) ,..., (
2 1 2 1
1 i i i i i
i
i i i i
i
n c U e c U c c u c c W
θ
λ λ λ
− + ∑ ∑  (2) 





n λ λ λ  We symbolize by 
1 − Δ
n   1 − n  simplex, in 
n R  i.e; the set of 
1 = ... : 1 n
n R λ λ λ + + ∈ + . 
 
Definition 1  An allocation  ) ,..., ( = 1 n c c c  is a specification of a consumption vector 
l l
i i i R R c c c + + × ∈ ) , ( =
2 1  for each consumer  n i 1,..., =  an period  1,2. = t  An allocation is 
feasible if  1,2. =




i ∀ Ω ≤ ∑  We denote the set of feasible allocations by  


















n n  
 
The utility possibility set for this economy is given by de subset of  :
n R+   
  { } n i c c u u F c R u U i i i i
n 1,... = ) , ( : ; =
2 1 ∀ ≤ ∈ ∃ ∈ +  
For an allocation  , c  we introduce the notation  ) (c u  to denote the utility vector 
)), ( ),..., ( ( = ) ( 1 1 n n c u c u c u  where  
 ) ( ) ( = ) , ( = ) (
2 1 2 1
i i i i i i i i i c U e c U c c u c u
θ − +  
By UP we symbolize the boundary of the utility possibility set. It is easy to see that if c is 
a Pareto optimal allocation, then  . ) ( UP c u ∈  
 4 
 






n n R λ λ ∑ +
− ∈ Δ  is homeomorphic to the 
boundary of the utility possibility set. 
 Proof: Consider the function: 
1 :
− →





= ) ( ξ  is 
continuous and establishes a bijection between de subsets 
1 − Δ
n  and UP.• 
 
3  A two-period economy without transferences 
 
In this section we focuss on the set of Pareto optimal allocations of a two periods 
economy. The Pareto optimal allocations corresponding to a neoclassical economy, are 
determined by the total amounts of wealth existing in the economy and not by the 
distribution of this wealth among the agents. We consider that the consumers faces two 
constraints one en each period. These constraints simply say that in each period, the 
aggregate consumption of the economy can not exceed the existing wealth. This constraint 





















So the set of feasible allocations are given by definition (1).  
 
The following proposition holds: 
Proposition 2 For every Pareto allocation  ) ,..., ( = 1 n c c c  there is vector 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  



























c u c W λ λ
 (3) 
and reciprocally, for each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  every solution to a problem (3) is a Pareto optimal 
allocation.  5 
 
 
 Proof: If the allocation  ), ,..., ( = 1 n c c c  where  ) , ( =
2 1
i i i c c c  is Pareto optimal, then 
the vector of utilities  . ) ( = UP c u u ∈  For each allocation c and 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  we can write:  
  [] i i
i
i i i i i
n
i
i i i i
i
u c U e c U c c u λ λ λ
θ ∑ ∑ ∑ + = ) ( ) ( = ) , (
2 1
1 =
2 1  
where ) ( ) ( = ) , ( =
2 1 2 1
i i i i i i i i c U e c U c c u u
θ +  and for each  ) ,..., ( = 1 n u u u  in the boundary of the 
utility possibility set there exists  :
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  u  solves the problem  
  u ui i
i u






= λ .• 
 
Remark 1  Notation:   








n U U U  by 
2 1 = U e U u
θ − +  we denote the 
vector  




1 1 n n n U e U U e U u u u
θ θ − − + +  
 
    • Let  ) , ( =
2 1 c c c  a feasible allocation, where  ) ,..., ( = 1
t
n
t t c c c  symbolize a feasible 
consumption bundle for period  1,2. = t   






n n n n c U e c U c U e c U c U e c U c u
θ θ θ − − − + + +   
    • By 
t F  we denote the feasible allocation set for period  1,2, = t   












ln t t c R c F  
  
Note that, if  UP U e U u ∈ +
− 2 1 =
θ  then 
1 1 UP U ∈  and 
2 2 UP U ∈  where by 
t UP , 
1,2 = t  we denote the boundary of the utility possibility set given by:  
  { } . ) ( : : = I i c U U F c R U U
t
i i i
t t n t ∈ ∀ ≤ ∈ ∃ ∈  
To explore the relationships of this social weights given by λ  with the first and second 
welfare theorems, let us consider the following intuition for the social weights. We 
consider, an economy with locally non satiable preferences, and such that every  ) (⋅ i u  is a 6 
 
differentiable and concave function. Note that pair 
l l n l l R R R R p c + + + + + +
∗ × × × ∈ ) ( ) , ( i s  
Walrasian equilibrium without transference if and only if the first order conditions of the n 




) , ( max
1 = 1 =
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
2 1
t w c










i i i i
i i i
l R l R i c
∑ ∑ ≤
+ ≤ +
+ × + ∈
 
are satisfied. Denoting by 
t
i γ  the respective multipliers, we obtain:  









∂ ∗ γ  (5) 
If now we consider the maximization problem (3) we obtain the first order conditions:  






i , , = ∀
∂
∂
ψ λ  (6) 
Where 1,2 = ,t
t ψ  are the multipliers corresponding to the maximization problem (3). 
So, once that 
t
j p  represent the marginal social utility of the good  j in time t then 




l p ψ =  then the following relationship are verified  
 
2 1 / = 1/ = i i i e γ γ λ
θ  
i.e: the weight  i λ  of the utility of the  th i −  consumer equals the reciprocal utility 
(discounted) evaluated at the supporting prices. 
 
4  A two-period economy with transferences 
 
It is natural to assume that any economy living for at least two periods, can trade 
current consumption for future consumption. This means that consumers face a trade-off 
between present and future consumption. 
Consider that the agents living in a two period economy E  can transfer resources 
from one period to another. After transference the endowments of the  th i −  consumer, in 
times  1,2, = t  are given by:  0 = ) (
1 ≥ + i i i i w w α α  then  0, = ) (
2 2 ≥ − i i i i w w α α  where 
l
il i i R ∈ ) ,..., ( = 1 α α α  is the vector of transference between periods. These inequalities mean 7 
 
that, after transference, the endowments have no negative components. This means that if 
0 < ij α  the  th i −  agent is transferring the amount  ij α  of  − j  good from the period 1 to 2, 
and then for the commodity  j the inequality  0 >
1
ij ij w α +  must be verified. Reciprocally, if 
0 > ij α  then the agent is transferring the amount  ij α  of  − j  good from the period 2 to 1 and 
for this commodity the inequality  0 >
2
ij ij w α −  must be verified. To denote the new 
economy (i.e: the after transference economy) we will use the symbolism  . α E  
By the symbol T  we denote the subset of 




















nl nl c c R R c c T  
Let  
  { } I w u R E i i i
l ), , ( , , = α α +  
be the economy after transference  , T ∈ α  where by  ) , ( i i w α  we denote the endowments 
after transference i.e:  . ) , ( = ) , (
2 1 I i w w w i i i i i i ∈ ∀ − + α α α  
 
Theorem 1  For each 
1 − Δ ∈




























+ Ω  (7) 
 is a Pareto optimal allocation, for the economy  . α E   
 
So, if there exists the possibility of transference between periods then the set of 
Pareto efficient allocations is not smaller than the set of Pareto optimal allocations of a two 
periods economy where transference between periods are not allowed. Note that the Pareto 
optimal allocations corresponding to an economy without transference correspond to the 
particular case where  0 = i iα ∑ . This means that the set of Walrasian allocations 8 
 
corresponding to an economy with transference is not smaller than the set of Walrasian 
allocations if transference are allowed. Recall that the set of Pareto optimal allocations of 
an economy E  does not depend on the distribution of the resources between the agents, 
but on the total amount available in each period. 
 
The next theorem is a reciprocal of theorem (1):  
Theorem 2  For each Pareto optimal allocation c  of the economy  α E  there exists 
a set of social weights 
1 − Δ ∈
































The intuition behind this theorem, is that each Pareto optimal allocation 
corresponds a vector of social social weights representing the relative weights of the agent 
in the economy. As we shown in section (3), it follows that being each Walrasian 
allocation a Pareto optimal allocation, each Walrasian equilibrium determines in an 
univocal way a set of social weights. 
For each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  fixed, let us consider the problem to maximize the social welfare, 
function based on an individual choice of an optimal  T ∈
∗ α . This problem can be written 
as follows: To find a feasible allocation verifying the inequalities:  
  T c W c W ∈ ∀ ≥
∗ α α λ α λ λ λ )) , ( ( )) , ( ( 
The function 
nl nl n R R T c × → × Δ
−1 :  defined as  ), , ( α λ c  solves for each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  and 
















c u max c W
α
α











) ( = )) , ( (
 (9) 9 
 
The real number  )) , ( ( α λ λ c W  is the social welfare level corresponding to the maximization 
problem (7). 
 
Theorem 3 For fixed 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  the function 
nl nl R R T c × → ⋅ : ) , (λ  is continuous.  
 Proof: Since T  is a compact subset of 
nl R  and the utilities are continuous 
functions, then the function  . : ) , (
nl nl R R T c × → ⋅ λ  is well defined. From the strict 
concavity of  , , I i ui ∈ ∀  it follows that, for fixed  λ λ =  the function  ) ( = ) , (
1 = i i i
n
i c u c W λ λ ∑  
is strictly concave function in  . c  Then if  ) , ( n c α λ  solves the corresponding problem (9) 
and if  α α → n  for  ∞ → n  then  ) , ( ) , ( α λ α λ c c n → .• 








∈ ∈ ∑ i
n
i
l A that such T exists there R A VT α α
1 =
= : = 




A if A c W c W α λ α λ λ λ ∑
1 =
= )) , ( ( = )) , ( (  
Let  } {1,..., = n I k ∈  and  } {1,...,l m∈ , considering λ  fixed and assuming the 



























∂ − ∑ ∑ ) , (
)) , ( (
) , (
)) , ( (






































θ λ  (10) 
where  } {1,..., =
1 = l j A ij
n



















So from a social point of view is preferable that the  th k −  consumer transfer good  j  from 
the first period to the second if and only if  









From the individual point of view of the  th k −  consumer, considering as given  






− n k k k α α α α α  
he looks for  i α  such that maximize  






− +  
So if,  
 
0 > ) , (
)) , ( (
) , (
)) , ( (
























































then the  th i −  consumer prefer to transfer the  th j −  good from the first period to the 
second, and reciprocally for the reciprocal inequality. So, it is possible to consider the 
optimal vector 
∗ α  as a cooperative solution (a Nash equilibrium) of a non cooperative 
game, where the set of pure strategies corresponds to the possible elections of lending and 
saving given by the vectors  T ∈ α . 
From inequalities (11) and (12), it follows that if agents with social commitment, 
can freely transfer resources between periods, then the individual solution to the problem 
of optimize the saving/consumption problem, match with the problem of maximize the 
social welfare. In the next section we look for a benevolent policy maker, we will see that 
his interest match with the interest of social committed individuals 
 
5  The central planer problem's 
 
Let  ) (A PO  be the set of Pareto optimal allocations corresponding to an economy 
where the transfer are given by  VT A∈ . Suppose that the central planner looks for the total 
amounts of transference between periods, i.e. The central planner looks for  i
n
i A α ∑ 1 = =  
since he is looking only for Pareto optimal allocations, does no mater how is the initial 
distribution of endowments, however does matter on the distribution of the endowments 
between periods. 
The set of feasible Pareto optimal allocations supported for a set of λ  is 
independent of the election  i α  of each consumer, but depends on the aggregate value 
i i A α ∑ =  of these elections. However, if the amount of transference  A between periods, 
change then, then the solution of the problem (7) can change. The solution c of this 11 
 
problem can be consider as a function 
l R K c + → × Δ :  defined by:  ) , ( = A c c λ  where 
{ } {} [ ]
l R K + ⊂ Ω Ω Ω Ω − 2 1
2 1 , min , , min =  such that, the  − i th coordinate is given by the 
corresponding minimum coordinate between the  th i −  coordinates of  1 Ω  and  . 2 Ω  
Consider  λ λ =  fixed, then changing in the amounts of  A modify the boundary of the 
utility possibility. So for each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  the Pareto optimal allocation solving the 
maximization problem (7). Then, for each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  and  K A∈  it make sense to consider 




A c t s



















) ( max = )) , ( ( λ λ λ
 (13) 
Let  ) , ( A c λ  be the solution of this problem, where λ  and  A are fixed. Let us write the 
problem of maximization given in (13), in the form  
  ). , ( max = )) , ( (
) (








nl R nl R VT + × + → 2 : φ  defined by  
  { } A c A c R R c c c A
ln ln − Ω + Ω × ∈ + +
2 2 1 1 2 1 = , = : ) , ( = = ) ( φ  
and  R A A W → ⋅ ) ( : ) , ( φ λ , defined by  





c u c A W λ λ ∑  
Let us define the function  R K W → : λ  given by  )), , ( ( = ) ( A c W A W λ λ λ  where 
R A c W ∈ )) , ( ( λ λ  is the solution of the problem (13) for  A fixed. For each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  it make 
sense to consider the maximization problem:  






Theorem 4  The function  R K W → ⋅ : ) ( λ  is a continuous function and reach its 
maximum value in the rectangle  . K   
 12 
 
 Proof: From the strict concavity of the utility functions, it follows that 
R K W → ⋅ : ) ( λ  is a function. From the maximum theorem we know that this function is 
continuous. Finally, from de Weierstrass theorem it follows that, for each  , Δ ∈ λ  the 
function  ) (A Wλ  reach its maximum value in the rectangle K .• 
Consider 
* A  such that  K A A W A W ∈ ∀ ≥ ) ( ) (
*
λ λ  where 
{ } { } [ ]. , min , , min =






i λ  the gradient vector of 
i u  evaluated at  ) , (
* A ci λ  and by  
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)) , ( (
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= ) , (

























































Assuming the differentiability of  ) (A Wλ , then from theorem (4) it follows that:  
Corolary 1  For each λ  here exists and optimal  T ∈
* α  maximizing the social 
welfare and for 
* * = A i iα ∑  it follows that  
  . 1,..., = 0 ) (






∂ λ  
 
The allocation  )) , (
∗ A c λ  is the efficient allocation of greater social value, possible 
to be reached by means of transference of resources in an economy, that is supported by a 
particular social structure represented by λ . 
Looking at equation (12) and this corollary it follows that, the total amount of the 




i α  is the same that solves 
the problem of the central planner, that is given by 
∗ A . 
However it should be noted that although the solution of the central planner and the 13 
 
individuals could match, individuals with better opportunities, must be willing to pursue a 
policy of transfers that ultimately aims to maximize social welfare. The degree of 
commitment of these individuals to society, will be the determining factor in the level of 
participation of central planner. 
Note that if transference between periods are free, the set of Pareto optimal 
allocations corresponding to the problems (7) changing  K A∈  is the same that the Pareto 
optimal allocations corresponding to the following problem: 
 
 
, = ) ( : .






+ × + ∈
i i
i
i i i i
i n l R l R c
c c t s
c c u λ
 (15) 
where  , =
2 1 Ω + Ω Ω  ) ,... ( = 1 n c c c  and  n i R c c c c
l t
i i i i 1,..., = , ), , ( =
2 1
+ ∈ ; 1,2 = t . 
Let  
  { } I i c u u that such F c R u U i i i
n ∈ ∀ ≤ ∈ ∃ ∈ + ) ( : = 
be the utility possibility set, where  
 . ) ( : ) ( =







Ω + Ω ≤ + × ∈ ∑ + + i i
n
i
n l l c c R R c F  
By UP we symbolize the border of the utility possibility set. 
Let  PO  be the set of Pareto optimal allocations corresponding to this problem, 
then  
 ) ( = A PO PO VT A∈ ∪  
If ) , (
2 1 Ω Ω PO  is the set of feasible Pareto optimal allocation set for a two periods 
economy without transfer, then:  
  PO PO ⊂ Ω Ω ) , (
2 1  






i i i c c c  be the bundle set for both periods for the  − i th consumer, corresponding 
with the optimal transference problem 
* α  given in corollary (1), i.e:  ). , ( =
* * α λ i i c c  Since 




n c c c  is Pareto efficient, then it solves:  
  ). ( = ) ( : . . ), ( = ) ( 2 1
2 1
1 =





F c c c t s c u c W max λ λ  (16) 
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6  Welfare and decentralization: a preliminary conclusion 
 
Similarly to what was done in section (6), let us consider the relationships of the 
social weights λ  with the first and second welfare theorems, in a two periods economy 
where transference are allowed. Given an economy  α E  where  , T ∈ α  a pair 
) ( ) ( ) , (
l l n l l R R R p c + + + + + + × × × ∈ α α  is Walrasian equilibrium with transference if and only if 
the first order conditions of the n budget constraint utility maximization problems (one for 




) ( ) ( . .























i i i i i i
i i i
l R l R i c
w c
w c







− + + ≤ +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
+ × + ∈
 
are satisfied, for each  . I i∈  Denoting by 
t
i α γ  the respective multipliers, we obtain:  












γ  (17) 
If we now consider the maximization problem (9) we obtain the first order conditions:  
  {1,2}. }, {1,..., }, {1,..., = ∈ ∈ ∈ ∀
∂
∂








ψ λ  (18) 
Where 1,2 = ,t
t
α ψ  are the multipliers corresponding to the maximization problem (9). 
So, once that 
t
j pα  represent the marginal social utility of the good  j in time t then 








1 / = 1/ = α
θ
α α γ γ λ e i i  
i.e: the weight  i λ  of the utility of the  th i −  consumer equals the reciprocal utility 
(discounted) evaluated at the supporting prices. 
In accordance with the first welfare theorem, every Walrasian allocation
5 is a 
Pareto optimal allocation. [Debreu, G.]. Thus, to each Walrasian equilibrium  ) , ( p c  
                                                       
5A Walrasian allocation, is an allocation belonging to a Walrasian equilibrium. 15 
 
corresponds a set of social weights  . λ  However, by itself, this first welfare theorem is not 
at all satisfying from an ethical point of view. For instance the Walrasian allocation does 
not necessarily maximize de social utility finction  ). (c Wλ  This theorem says only that 
perfect markets produce Pareto efficient outcomes, without any mention at all of 
distributive or social justice. Indeed, dictatorships and extreme inequality [Bergstrom, T.] 
even slavery or starvation [Coles, J.L.; Hammond, P.] can all be Pareto efficient. 
The second welfare theorem is ethically much more satisfying, since it 
characterizes (virtually) all Pareto efficient allocations, both just and unjust. This theorem 
identifies conditions under which any Pareto optimal allocation can be able to be supported 
by a set of prices, in our case it will have the form,  . 1,..., = ) , ( =
2 1 l j p p p j j j  However most 
of the works consider only static or one period economies. Yet Fisher (1907, 1930) and 
Hicks (1939) were able to describe intertemporal allocations of resources by means of 
bundles of dated commodities. In [Willmann, G.] is shown that, in a two-period general 
equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, Pareto gains from trade may be unreachable 
if the government uses lump-sum redistribution after trade liberalization without being able 
to commit to a particular redistributive policy beforehand. However, focussing in to 
develop a economic policy committed to achieve an optimal vector of transference 
between periods  ,
∗ A , it is possible to obtain Pareto gains for a policy of saving and 
lending. This result can be obtained by the action of a central planer or by means the action 
of the individual agents with some degree of social commitment. In both cases is necessary 
to play an strategy whose result should be the vector of transference 
∗ A  corresponding 
with the solution of  )), , ( ( max A c W VT A λ λ ∈  i.e:  
  VT A A c W A c W ∈ ∀ ≥
∗ )) , ( ( ) , ( ( λ λ λ λ  
The same result can be obtained by the central planner if is able to implement a economic 
policy whose result is 
∗ A , or by individual agents choosing some  T ∈
∗ α  verifying 
∗ ∗ ∑ i
n
i A α
1 = = , according with theorem (1). 
Let  ) ~ , ~ ( p c  be a Walrasian equilibrium for an economy E  and let λ ~ be the social 
weights corresponding to this equilibrium. Recall that for every Pareto optimal allocation 
c  there exists a vector of social weights 
1 ~ − Δ ∈
n λ  such that  ). ( ~ ~
1 = i i i
n
i c u argmax c λ ∑ ∈  We 
say that the economy  ∗ α E  is at least as good as the economy E  under  , ~ λ  if and only if in 16 
 
∗ α E  the allocation  ) , (
∗ α λ c  can be attained as an allocation of equilibrium. Symbolically 
we write:  
  E E λ α
~ ± ∗  
On the other side according with corollary (1) such  I i i ∈ ∀
* α  represents the individual 
optimal saving/consumption policy. Or from the point of view of a benevolent policy 
maker, his goal will be to implement a two periods policy, such that in the first one be able 
to convince the agents to interchange 
*
1 = = : A i
n
i α α ∑  between periods, and in the second 
one, to implement a resource transference among the agents in such way that the allocation 
* c  can be attained as an equilibrium allocation. If agents of the economy E  looks for 
maximize the social welfare utility, then they prefer  * α E  and the social planner can be 
dispensed. 
Notice that the maximum level of social welfare feasible to be obtained for a 
benevolent policy maker, corresponds to an economy  ∗ A E  where 
∗ ∑ A i
n
i =
1 =α . This level is 
the same that the maximum social welfare feasible to be attained by the action of 
individual agents in the economy  ∗ α E . In this sense we can say that: from a social point of 
view these economies are equivalents, i.e.:  
  ∗ ∗ ≈
α λ E E
A  
However the central planner must be careful, because the action of the central planner 
implementing a policy to attain the allocation maximizing the welfare, make that the 
economy change from E  to  . * A E  In this process, the distribution of the endowments 
between periods, change (even if in aggregate does not change), if this happen then, along 
this way changes in prices and allocations of equilibrium occur, prices change from  j p  to 
l j p
j A 1,2,..., = , *  and social weights change from λ  to  . * A λ  At the end of this process the 
allocation ) , (
* A c λ  can be attained as an equilibrium allocation with the new system of 
prices  . * A p  The second welfare theorem ensure this possibility. But this target can be 
attained following a smooth path, if and only if the changes in endowments give place only 
to regular economies, but if along this path there is a singular economy, then changes will 
be sudden and unforeseeable see [Accinelli, E.]. 17 
 
In conclusion, the participation of the central planner can be dispensed if the agents 
of the economy have a degree of commitment with the social welfare, and if they are able 
to play a non-cooperative game, consisting in lending and borrowing according with the 
strategic vector 
∗ α . However, the non uniqueness of the Walrasian equilibrium, can be a 
problem to obtain the allocation maximizing the social welfare in a decentralized way in 
the new economies, either in the economy  ∗ α E  determined by the social committed 
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